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Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules
Jonathan S. Masur†

Patent law’s infringement doctrines, commonly understood to be simply rules of liability, are
in fact search rules as well. Patent liability rules determine not only who will be responsible for
what conduct, but also when patent holders and potential infringers will benefit from locating (or
remaining ignorant of) one another. They thus affect the conditions under which parties will have
incentives to engage in search. The dynamics of patent search are actually quite complicated.
Under normal circumstances, patent law’s liability rules generate approximately optimal
investments in search as both patent holders and possible infringers have incentives to locate one
another. But when a direct infringer is insolvent or unreachable, the fact that contributory
infringers can be held liable only when they have knowledge of the patent shifts search
responsibilities toward patent holders. Search incentives are also affected by patent law’s rules
regarding past conduct and by the possibility of holdup problems based on alleged infringers’
product-specific investments. This Article demonstrates that patent law’s liability rules may be
generating inefficient levels of search and corresponding social welfare losses and proposes a
simple doctrinal corrective.

INTRODUCTION
The patent law doctrines of direct and contributory infringement are, first and
foremost, doctrines of liability. The infringement doctrines allocate liability for the
unlicensed use of a patented invention among the patent holder, the firm that produces the
infringing product, and any other firms that supply significant components of that
1
product. This point is so obvious that it is rarely remarked upon. Yet perhaps because it
is so obvious, it has served to obscure these rules’ other significant function: they allocate
search responsibilities (and search costs) among the same parties. The rules governing
patent liability are also rules that govern patent search.
The explanation lies with the incentives that these rules create for parties to learn of
patents (and infringing goods) earlier or later in time. Patent holders nearly always have
incentives to locate infringers; once they know of the existence of infringing behavior, they
can elect where and when to open licensing negotiations or file suit. When a producer of
goods is directly liable for infringement, it too has incentives to locate (and license) patents
ex ante. The producer is liable for infringing behavior that occurs even before the date a
patent holder files suit, and so it would only be setting a trap for itself were it to begin
producing without a license in place.

†Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank Richard Epstein, Mark Lemley,
Saul Levmore, Doug Lichtman, and participants at the Licensing of Intellectual Property symposium at The
University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments. I also thank Joe Bingham for excellent research
assistance.
1 See 35 USC § 271(a), (c).
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The equation changes, however, when the direct infringer of a patent is insolvent or
otherwise unavailable for suit. A patent holder may still be able to sue suppliers of
components for the final product or other related parties under the doctrine of
contributory infringement. But these contributory infringers are not immediately liable.
Rather, liability attaches only when the patent holder knows of both the existence of the
patent and the producer’s failure to obtain a license. It cannot be held liable for conduct
that occurs before it learns of the patent.
This incentive to remain ignorant shifts the entire search burden to the patent holder,
which cannot rely on possible (contributory) infringers to seek it out. And because the
patent holder also cannot determine in advance when direct infringers will be insolvent or
unavailable, it will end up conducting broader searches in the hope of locating the proper
parties. Both patent holders and possible infringers will utilize mixed strategies, investing
resources in search in some cases but not others. And in many cases infringers will engage
in suboptimal levels of search, forcing patent holders to search at inefficient levels. The
result is social waste, generated by the manner in which the doctrine of contributory
infringement shields unknowing parties from liability.
Interestingly, this dynamic is present in few other areas of law. Patent law is
distinctive in that the “harm”—patent infringement—frequently occurs without any
discernable impact upon the aggrieved party, and in places that are physically distant
from the patent holder. Furthermore, the plaintiffs and defendants in patent cases are
often strangers, and the parties may not even be aware of one another’s existence. By
contrast, parties to a contract dispute are by definition familiar with one another.
Similarly, the typical tort case does not involve any particular mystery regarding the
identities of the plaintiff and defendant. The two have generally interacted in some
immediate fashion, or the defendant is one of a finite number of potential actors. Contract
and tort defendants also cannot shield themselves from liability through ignorance. But in
intellectual property cases, the putative plaintiff and defendant may have no knowledge
of either the harm or each other. For some defendants, this ignorance even serves as a
complete defense. The need to expend resources on search thus rises to the fore.
This Article proceeds in two Parts. Part I describes the doctrine of contributory
infringement as a legal outlier and analyzes the complex incentives for search that it
creates. Part II proceeds normatively: it demonstrates that the search behaviors that arise
as a result of patent law’s liability rules will in some cases diminish social welfare, and it
suggests a simple doctrinal solution.
I. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
The doctrine of contributory infringement functions best when it is least necessary.
When a patent owner can sue the direct infringer, the doctrine will allow parties within a
supply chain to allocate liability among themselves so as to minimize search and
licensing costs. When the direct infringer is unavailable for suit, however, the doctrine
channels search costs toward the patent holder, who likely can handle them least
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efficiently. The result is social waste, driven by the ability of contracting parties to escape
liability and allocate search costs to the owner of the patent.
A. Contributory Infringement Doctrine in Comparative Context
Whether measured against other patent doctrines, or even against other legal
doctrines more generally, patent law’s doctrine of contributory infringement is an outlier.
The reason is the mens rea requirement it imposes. Before a party can be held liable as a
contributory infringer of a patent, that party must have knowledge of two distinct facts:
(1) the existence of the patent, and (2) whether the direct infringer—with whom the
contributory infringer is likely in contractual privity—has obtained a license on the
2
patent. In other words, the putative contributory infringer must be aware of the full legal
status of the patent and the relationship between the direct infringer and the patent holder.
This is an extraordinary requirement, one that is present few other places in the law.
By and large, patent law is based upon strict liability. There is no mens rea requirement
3
attached to literal infringement or infringement by equivalents. Patentability doctrines
4
such as novelty and the statutory bars similarly involve no particular state of mind.
Copyright’s doctrine of contributory infringement is highly unsettled, but at least in some
formulations constructive knowledge—a party “should have known” that infringement was
5
occurring—will suffice.
Even within the criminal law it is rare for liability to be imposed only in the presence
6
of knowing—as opposed to negligent or reckless—conduct. In addition, the demand that
the alleged infringer know of the existence of a patent and the nonexistence of a license

2 See 35 USC § 271(c); Aro Manufacturing Co v Convertible Top Replacement Co, 377 US 476, 488
(1964) (“[Section] 271(c) does require a showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew that the combination for which his component was especially designed was both patented and infringing.”). This Article
focuses on contributory infringement, rather than induced infringement, because the latter imposes an even
greater mens rea requirement. See 35 USC § 271(b); Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39
UC Davis L Rev 225, 237–38 (2005) (“In part to avoid these problems, courts interpreting the 1952 Patent
Act have uniformly interpreted section 271(b) to require not just knowledge, and certainly not mere willful
blindness, but also a ‘specific intent and action to induce infringement.’”) (citation omitted). The inducement doctrine is also in a state of some flux. At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in a case that will likely clarify exactly what degree of intent is necessary for liability. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc v SEB S.A., 131 S Ct 458 (2010).
3 A mens rea requirement is present only within the related doctrine of induced infringement, 35 USC
§ 271(b), and the doctrine of willful infringement, which awards treble damages against defendants who
have engaged in particularly egregious conduct by continuing to infringe after they learn of the existence of
the patent. 35 USC § 284.
4 See 35 USC §§ 101–02.
5 See, for example, In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F3d 643, 650 (7th Cir 2003) (holding that
the owner of file-sharing software cannot escape liability for the copyright infringement of its users simply
by encrypting the transferred data and thus avoiding direct knowledge of any infringements).
6 See, for example, MPC § 2.02(3) (ALI 1985) (stating that “recklessness” will suffice for culpability
under most criminal statutes).
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verges on requiring knowledge of the legal status of the act, a condition that has been
7
roundly rejected in criminal (not to mention civil) law.
The knowledge requirement in patent’s doctrine of contributory infringement is usually
defended on the ground that it would be unfair to hold the supplier of a part liable if that part
8
were to eventually find its way into a larger, infringing product. Without actions by others,
9
the contributory infringer has done nothing wrong. Thus, it seems appropriate to hold the
contributory infringer liable only when it was somehow responsible for—or at least aware
of—the actions of these others. On its own terms, this seems a reasonable defense of
contributory infringement’s knowledge requirement, and it most likely explains its
existence. But contributory infringement is not merely a rule that assigns liability when
infringement has occurred. It is also a rule that assigns search obligations among parties,
requiring some to actively seek out their counterparts while permitting others to remain
inactive. Accordingly, the contributory infringement rules have significant economic impact
even when no suit is ever brought. They play a large role in selecting which parties will
bear the transaction costs involved in locating and licensing intellectual property. And they
impact the contractual relationships between patent holders, producers, and parts suppliers.
B. Liability-Driven Search
Consider a simple model involving four actors: a patent holder, a producer (P), a first
supplier (S1), and a second supplier (S2). The patent holder owns a valuable patent but
does not practice the invention; the producer either manufactures a good or engages in a
10
process that might infringe the patent; the first supplier manufactures an important
component of the producer’s good and sells it to the producer; and the second supplier
manufactures an important component of the first supplier’s good and sells it to the first
supplier. Assume that both the existence of the patent and the existence of the potentially
infringing good are costly to discover (as is typically the case).
As an initial matter, consider a situation in which the producer is solvent and available
for suit. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of contributory negligence is largely
irrelevant: the patent holder will always have the opportunity to sue the direct infringer (the
producer). The producer will thus have an incentive to search for all patents that its product
might infringe. Moreover, the producer will have an incentive to conduct this search as early
7 See, for example, MPC § 2.02(9) (stating that knowledge of whether conduct constitutes an offense
is itself never an element of a criminal offense).
8 See, for example, Matthew T. Nesbitt, Comment, From Oil Lamps to Cell Phones: What the Trilateral Offices Can Teach Us about Detangling the Metaphysics of Contributory Infringement, 21 Emory Intl
L Rev 669, 686 (2007) (explaining that the knowledge requirement “was no doubt intended to prevent the
almost unlimited liability that would result if a manufacturer produced a component covered by any claim
of an enforceable patent”).
9 Aro Manufacturing, 377 US at 482–83 (“[I]f there is no direct infringement of a patent there can be
no contributory infringement.”).
10 The term “producer” is meant very generally. The producer could be any entity from a private user
who violates a method patent in the privacy of her own home to a major manufacturing company. The salient differences between these possible parties will become clear in the examples that follow.
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in the process of developing and marketing a product as possible. If the producer begins to
market the product and is located by the patent holder only later, it will be liable for all
infringing conduct that occurred within six years of the date on which the patent holder files
11
suit. And if the producer knowingly infringes the patent without attempting to negotiate a
license, it may be liable in addition for treble damages under the doctrine of willful
12
infringement.
If the producer does not search for potential patents early in the process, it runs the
risk of having its infringing behavior discovered only after it has made capital
investments in technology or materials specific to the patented product. The producer
would run the risk of being subjected to the classic holdup problem: if a patent holder can
obtain an injunction against an infringing producer, then it can drive a very hard bargain
against the producer by threatening to shut down production and render worthless the
13
producer’s product-specific investments. The producer thus has an incentive to locate
the patent holder before it makes irrevocable product-specific investments that the patent
holder might later be able to exploit.
Despite the producer’s obvious incentives to search for patent holders, patent holders
must simultaneously search for producers. If they did not, producers would have no
reason ever to search for existing patents, as they would have no fear of being caught and
sued. Accordingly, patent holders will utilize a type of mixed strategy, investing some
resources in searching but limiting their search to allow producers to bear most of the
14
expense.
The producer’s and patent holder’s searches will thus proceed simultaneously.
Importantly, however, there should be few wasted resources from these coincident
searches. The two searches are independent of one another and do not cover the same
territory: the producer is searching for patents, while the patent holder is searching for
15
products. If either party locates the other, it will establish contact and attempt to
negotiate a license, at which point both searches end.
11 See 35 USC § 286.
12 35 USC § 284 (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”); In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F3d 1360, 1371 (Fed Cir 2007) (setting forth the modern
standard for determining when infringement has been willful).
13 See Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible
Threats, 33 J Legal Stud 391, 412 (2004); Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 29–33
(Oxford 1995).
14 For an analysis of mixed strategies in law, see Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C.
Picker, Game Theory and the Law 313 (Harvard 1994) (describing a mixed strategy equilibrium as one in
which “one or more of the players adopts a strategy that randomizes among a number of pure strategies”).
15 This is in contrast to any number of other economic races, in which two parties compete along the
same dimension to be the first to complete some activity. In many types of races, including patent races, the
losing party’s effort is entirely social waste. See, for example, John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 Tex L Rev 505, 530–31 (2010); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv L Rev 397, 440 (2009) (“Thus, the patent race literature proves that firms
will make socially excessive (and often duplicative) investments if they capture all the total surplus created by
their innovations.”).
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Now, it is possible that one of the two parties—either the patent holder or the
producer—is more efficient at engaging in search. If this is the case, then the system will
generate some amount of inefficiency because the less efficient searcher will nonetheless
be involved in the search to at least some small degree. The patent holder and producer
cannot contract with one another for the search to be performed by the most efficient party
because, by hypothesis, they have not located one another. The producer and the two
suppliers can, however, allocate the costs of searching for a patent by contract. For
instance, suppose that P is assembling circuit boards using chips built by S1, which in turn
incorporate specially developed transistors produced by S2. Despite the fact that P is the
end manufacturer, S2 may have greater knowledge and expertise regarding the universe of
patents in the industry. This could be the case if the vast majority of relevant patents
covered transistors, rather than fully assembled circuit boards. Accordingly, S2 might
indemnify S1 and P against the threat of patent infringement, effectively assuming the costs
of searching and licensing any existing patents. The possibility of this type of efficient
contracting is driven by P’s potential liability, which it must address in some fashion.
C. Search without Direct Infringement
Now, consider a situation in which the producer is judgment proof or otherwise
16
unavailable for suit. Under these circumstances, the producer has no incentive to
acquire information regarding the existence of the patent. For the producer, there is no
downside to being sued for infringement, and thus no reason to expend resources
searching for potential patents and negotiating (and paying for) licenses. Even if the
producer knows of the existence of the patent, it may well be in its best interest not to
contact the patent holder and attempt to negotiate a license. But contributory infringers
17
(S1 or S2) might nonetheless be solvent and potential targets for litigation.
1. Producers and suppliers without product-specific investments.
How will the parties behave? Consider first the case in which the production of the
good—here, a circuit board and its accompanying components—does not involve any
specific investments by the producer and suppliers. For instance, S2 may not need to
develop or install any specialized equipment in order to manufacture the transistors that

16 There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. For instance, the producer might simply
be insolvent or insufficiently capitalized to pay a judgment of infringement. The producer might be located
in a jurisdiction that US law does not reach and thus may not be available for suit. Or, most likely, the
“producer” may be an individual who violates a patent in the privacy of his own home and is not practically
amenable to suit for infringement. See, for example, Lucent Technologies v Gateway, Inc, 580 F3d 1301,
1320–22 (Fed Cir 2009) (involving a suit against Microsoft for contributory infringement of a patent for
using a calendar function, in which the direct infringers were individual users who installed Microsoft programs and ran the calendar function).
17 It is not uncommon for a large company to supply a component of a larger invention to a smaller
producer, creating situations in which the supplier continues as a going concern even after the producer has
become insolvent.
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will go into this circuit board; it may need only to calibrate its machinery slightly
differently (at low cost).
Under these circumstances, the suppliers will understand that they can be shielded
18
from liability by simply remaining unaware of the patent, and they will avoid expending
19
any resources searching. This extends to the point of deliberate attempts to remain
ignorant: the suppliers will actively endeavor to avoid learning of the patent from the
20
producer, even if the producer already has knowledge of its existence. The suppliers even
have incentives to contract with the producer that this information not be shared, even if it
were costless for the producer to share the information. For that matter, the producer may
know of the patent ahead of time and thus might be liable as a willful infringer, but it would
have no reason to fear liability itself and no reason to share the information with the
supplier. The producer might even pirate technical information from a patent, share that
information with a supplier without divulging its source, and then allow the supplier to
build parts to the patent’s specification without ever attempting to license the patent. In
effect, the knowledge requirement acts as a shield that allows the producer and suppliers to
draft a contract that maximizes their gains at the expense of the third-party patent holder.
From the perspective of the patent holder, the problems are twofold. First, the patent
holder will understand the suppliers’ incentives to remain ignorant of the patent and will
be forced to expend resources searching for infringing products. Here, the patent holder
must conduct the entire search; there is no corresponding party who will be
simultaneously searching for patents. And it is quite likely that the patent holder is not the
lowest-cost searcher. Patents are not necessarily easy or cheap to find. A patent may not
contain the key words that a potential infringer would expect to find in a search, or it may
21
concern an invention that appears largely unrelated to the technology at issue. It is for
this reason that commercial firms are often caught unawares by suits for infringement
based on patents that they would undoubtedly have preferred to have discovered and
22
licensed.
18 See Aro Manufacturing, 377 US at 488.
19 Of course, a supplier might directly infringe another patent, and thus would be forced to search for
that patent and arrange licensing deals. But that search and the search for patents that might be infringed by
the finished product will frequently diverge. For instance, in the example described above, S2 would be
concerned only with patent processes for manufacturing semiconductors, rather than product patents on
circuit boards and related semiconductor devices.
20 See, for example, Nesbitt, Comment, 21 Emory Intl L Rev at 708 (cited in note 8) (“[T]he U.S. approach to the knowledge requirement can have the unintended effect of encouraging manufacturers to remain ignorant about issued patents.”); Alfred P. Ewert and Irah H. Donner, Will the New Information Superhighway Create “Super” Problems for Software Engineers? Contributory Infringement of Patented or
Copyrighted Software-Related Applications, 4 Albany L J Sci & Tech 155, 202 (1994) (“[A]t least in this
instance, ignorance is ‘bliss.’”).
21 See, for example, In re Schreiber, 128 F3d 1473, 1474 (Fed Cir 1997) (holding that a patent on a
conical top used to dispense oil for industrial use read on the invention of a cone-shaped top for slowly
dispensing popcorn).
22 See, for example NTP, Inc v Research In Motion, Ltd, 418 F3d 1282, 1287 (Fed Cir 2005) (involving a suit against the manufacturer of the BlackBerry concerning a patent that it did not know existed).
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Yet patents are at least electronically indexed and searchable. Physical products, on
24
the other hand, are rarely available in any type of searchable index. Moreover, the
features of a product that infringe a patent are often not apparent from the front of the
product’s packaging—this can be private information that is costly to discover from the
25
product itself. In many cases, the patent holder will be forced to examine and analyze
26
the product in some detail to ascertain whether it infringes the patent. Thus, even
though it is undoubtedly difficult for a producer to locate relevant patents, as a
comparative matter, it is likely easier for a producer to find relevant patents than for a
patent holder to locate potentially infringing products. It is for this reason that patents are
more commonly analyzed and cited by Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examiners
27
than any other type of prior art—the search costs are comparatively lower.
Consequently, forcing the patent holder to conduct the entire search will result in
inefficient expenditures of resources that could be more efficiently deployed by a firm
within the chain of production. By effectively reallocating search costs from producers to
patent holders, the knowledge requirement built into the doctrine of contributory
infringement will lead to wasteful behavior.
The prospect of an insolvent producer and shielded suppliers will also exert feedback
effects even in cases in which the producer is not insolvent. If patent holders knew that all
potential infringers were solvent, they would understand that these infringers had
incentives to locate and license their patents. They could then reduce their own search
activities accordingly. This would be efficient, if indeed it is the case that producers can
search for patents at lower cost than patent holders can search for products. But when
some producers are insolvent, the overall rate at which producers search for patents will
decline. The less producers spend searching for patents, the more patent holders must
23 See United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), Search for Patents, online at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search (visited Oct 25, 2010) (providing a searchable database of
patents, with images for patents filed after 1790 and full-text searching for patents filed after 1976).
24 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley, and Bhaven N. Sampat, Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the Presumption of Validity *12 (unpublished manuscript, Aug 10, 2010),
online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1656568 (visited Oct 25, 2010).
25 See, for example, Dunlop Holdings v Ram Golf Corp, 524 F2d 33, 34, 35 n 7 (7th Cir 1975) (involving a patent on a coating for golf balls, the formula for which could only be determined—with difficulty—
by chemically analyzing the coating).
26 To be certain, the producer may have to hire an attorney to examine a patent before understanding
whether its product infringes. This can be quite costly. But a patent holder must examine a potentially infringing product and hire an attorney to assess its own patent before it can initiate an infringement suit. The
fact that the patent holder owns the patent does not mean that it will instantly understand the metes and
bounds of that property right and its applicability to a new technology.
27 See Susan Walmsley Graf, Comment, Improving Patent Quality through Identification of Relevant
Prior Art: Approaches to Increase Information Flow to the Patent Office, 11 Lewis & Clark L Rev 495, 503
(2007) (“[E]xaminer-cited prior art references are heavily weighted toward U.S. and foreign patents, as
opposed to non-patent literature.”). See also Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 577,
589 (1999) (observing that US patents make up 60 percent of all references cited in software patents). Patents are available at lower cost than nearly any other type of technical information, particularly actual
physical products.
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adjust their mixed strategy to expend greater resources on searching, because the less
28
they will be able to rely on producers’ incentives to locate patents in the first instance.
And the more that patent holders are forced to conduct the search, the greater the
inefficiency and waste.
This is not the only potential problem. Even if the patent holder succeeds in
discovering the existence of the product, as well as the producer’s relationship with one
or both suppliers, the patent holder cannot collect damages on sales that have already
occurred. In the event that the patent holder manages to learn of the product’s existence,
it will immediately notify the producer and suppliers of its patent and the likelihood of
infringement. This notification imbues the suppliers with the necessary knowledge to
29
satisfy the requirements of contributory infringement. But it is prospective only: the
30
suppliers’ conduct before they received notice is unreachable. The patent holder will
never recoup the lost royalties or profits from those pre-notice activities. By contracting
to preserve the suppliers’ ignorance regarding potential contributory infringement, the
31
producer and suppliers maximize their joint surplus at the patent holder’s expense.
2. Producers and suppliers who have made specific investments.
Now consider the possibility that the producers or suppliers involved in the
production of a product might have made investments specific to that product in the
course of bringing it to market. For instance, S1 may have had to purchase new chip
fabrication machines to construct integrated circuits to the specifications laid out by P.
These new machines might be expensive, and they might be useful only in the production
of chips built to the specifications that P has outlined—specifications that may infringe
an existing patent. Product-specific investments present economic risk to suppliers who
would otherwise be shielded from contributory liability by their lack of knowledge.
Recall that if a patent holder can locate a supplier that has made significant productspecific investments, it can drive a hard bargain in licensing negotiations by threatening
32
to block the supplier’s activities and destroy the value of those investments.
If it is P that must make the product-specific investments, then there will likely be
little effect. P is already insolvent or unreachable, and the threat of having its product-

28 See Baird, Gertner, and Picker, Game Theory at 31–38 (cited in note 14).
29 See, for example Aro Manufacturing, 377 US at 488–89; Trell v Marlee Electronics Corp, 912 F2d
1443, 1448 (Fed Cir 1990); Armstrong v Motorola, 374 F2d 764, 773 (7th Cir 1967).
30 Trell, 912 F2d at 1447 (“[T]he knowledge requirement of section 271(c) limit[s] an alleged contributory infringer’s liability to sales made after it receive[s] a letter from the patentholder informing it of the
existence of the patent.”). See also Aro Manufacturing, 377 US at 491 (“Aro cannot be held liable in the
absence of a showing that at the time it had already acquired the requisite knowledge that the Ford car tops
were patented and infringing.”).
31 In Part II, I consider whether this transfer of wealth from patent holders to producers and suppliers
has negative dynamic effects on welfare as well. For the moment, it suffices to note that producers and
other commercial firms will be able to use ignorance as a substitute for licensing relevant patents, to the
detriment of patent holders.
32 See text accompanying note 13.
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specific investments rendered worthless is likely not significant. If instead it is S1 or S2 that
must make the product-specific investments, then the situation is different. Even if S1
cannot be sued for infringement without first being notified by the patent holder of the
existence of a patent, and even if S1 cannot be sued for conduct that predates this
notification, S1 may very well have something to lose in the event that a patent exists: the
value of these product-specific investments. If the patent holder can locate S1, then it can
extract significant concessions—perhaps including the equivalent of damages for past
conduct—in exchange for allowing S1 to continue to produce the good, preserving the
value of its investments.
The potential bargaining between the patent holder and S1 over a license on the
patent is not straightforward, but a simple numerical example should suffice to illustrate
the holdup problem that S1 would face in the event that it made product-specific
investments. Suppose that there are two potential components that S1 could devote its
resources to producing: A and B. If S1 produces A, it can earn yearly profits of $1,000 for
each of the next five years; if S1 produces B, it can earn yearly profits of $900 for each of
the next five years. In either case, S1 will be forced to make an upfront investment of
33
$2,000 to produce the good. Suppose S1 invests $2,000 to produce A and then is
contacted by a patent holder who owns a patent on the finished product of which A is a
component. It is worth $2,500 to S1 to be allowed to continue producing A, and thus the
34
patent holder may be able to extract up to that amount to license the patent. This
represents a significant fraction of the total profits ($3,000) that S1 stood to realize when
it made the initial investment in producing A.
Contrast this with the bargaining power available to the patent holder if the
production of A and B does not involve any upfront product-specific investments or if S1
has not yet made those investments. In that case, it is worth only $500 to S1 to be able to
35
produce A rather than B. (This is obviously a much smaller percentage of the value
created by S1’s production of A or B.) Thus, if S1 can locate the patent holder before it is
forced to choose between producing goods A and B, it can lower its potential liability
36
substantially.

33 This upfront investment would typically involve the purchase of specialized machinery, or even the
hiring of particular employees skilled in the relevant tasks.
34 This value is based on the alternatives available to S1. S1 could switch to producing B, but this
would require another investment of $2,000 and would yield net profits of $2,500 ($900  5 – $2,000). If
S1 were allowed to continue producing A, it could earn $5,000; the $2,000 it has invested in new machinery
is a sunk cost. The net value to S1 of being able to continue producing A is thus $5,000 – $2,500 = $2,500.
35 S1 stands to earn $5,000 over five years from producing A and $4,500 over the same time period
from producing B. Because S1 has not yet made an A-specific upfront investment, the patent holder cannot
extract the value of that investment from S1 in licensing negotiations.
36 This analysis assumes that there are no uses for A that would not be covered by the patent. If there
were, S1 would be doubly protected against holdup by the patent’s owner. If S1 can sell good A to another
producer whose end product will not violate a patent, then S1 can simply transfer its sales when confronted
by the patent holder and need not negotiate a license. In addition, if this were the case, A might qualify as
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S1 will accordingly be willing to invest in searching for patents (on the finished
products of which A and B would form components) before agreeing to produce either of
the two. But its interest in conducting this search is far from limitless. S1 is only willing to
search for holders of patents that might involve A and B up to the difference in value
between finding those patents ahead of time and failing to find them—here, somewhere
37
between $0 and $2,000. And S1 must discount the value of conducting the search by the
chances that patent holders never discover that it is producing products that contribute to
infringement.
At the same time, however, suppliers who must make product-specific investments are
precisely the firms that patent holders will be most interested in locating. The reason is the
same: patent holders will be able to extract the greatest licensing fees from these firms
precisely because they have already made product-specific investments that they are at risk
of losing. The more difficult question is whether patent holders will be able to determine ex
ante whether suppliers will be forced to make product-specific investments—or whether
their patents are the type that give rise to product-specific investments more generally.
Answering this question requires extremely detailed knowledge of the technology and
markets involved. For instance, suppose an inventor holds a patent on a type of integrated
circuit. The inventor may know that a supplier must install a large, expensive silicon etching
38
machine in order to produce that type of integrated circuit. But it is a step further for the
inventor to know whether a supplier can make use of these machines only in the production
of one type of integrated circuit or whether they can be readily adapted to a variety of
different components.
All else being equal, capital-intensive technologies will likely require greater
production-specific investments. Inventors holding patents over those types of
technologies will invest greater resources in search. For the most part, though, patent
holders will likely be ignorant regarding the vulnerability of potential litigation targets.
Suppliers themselves will possess better information regarding their own need for
production-specific investments, and so they are more likely to adjust their expenditures
on search accordingly. The result is a new mixed-strategy equilibrium. Patent holders will
maintain a baseline level of investment in search, with holders of patents in capital“a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use” and thus not be
subject to suit for contributory infringement. 35 USC § 271(c).
37 The difference between locating the patent holder before S1 makes an initial product-specific investment and locating the patent holder only afterward is $2,500 – $500 = $2,000. Of course, it is unlikely
that the patent holder would be able to extract the entire surplus in licensing fees. More likely, it will settle
for some amount up to a maximum of $2,000. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J Legal Stud 399, 417–29 (1973) (describing the manner in
which parties to a civil lawsuit will opt to divide the surplus from settlement); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61, 101–06 (1971) (same).
38 See, for example, Applied Materials, Applied Materials Fact Sheet (Aug 2010), online at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MjYyMTM1M3xDaGlsZElEP
TQwNTEzOHxUeXBlPTI=&t=1 (visited Oct 25, 2010) (“Founded in 1967, Applied Materials creates and
commercializes the nanomanufacturing technology that helps produce virtually every semiconductor chip
and flat panel display in the world.”).
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intensive industries expending slightly greater resources. Suppliers who must make
product-specific investments will engage in relatively high levels of search; suppliers
who need not make any product-specific investments will not search at all.
These strategies also create a potential mismatch between the incentives faced by
(insolvent) producers and suppliers. As noted above, when a producer is unavailable for
suit and a supplier need not make any product-specific investments, neither party has any
interest in locating an infringed patent. Neither has anything to lose from being held liable,
and they can safely engage in production and sales unless (or until) a patent holder locates
them. If the supplier must make product-specific investments, however, it may have a great
deal to lose in the event that the patent holder is able to locate it (or the producer).
Under these circumstances, S1 runs an economic risk if it begins manufacturing a
component for P without first ensuring that no relevant patent exists. In light of this risk,
S1 could take one of two actions: (1) it could engage in a search for relevant patents at
some cost, and presumably pass that cost along to P in the form of a higher price for the
components it supplies; or (2) it could simply price those components at a premium to
39
reflect the litigation risk involved. For its part, however, P will prefer that S1 remain
ignorant of any potential patents. If S1 does not believe there is any liability risk, then it
will sell to P at a lower price. This issue is further complicated by the fact that the
patents, if they exist, will be patents on P’s product, not S1’s component. P might thus be
better positioned to determine what risk S1 might face. But S1 cannot rely on P to
indemnify it—P is insolvent. Nor can S1 fully rely on P to search for relevant patents,
given that P has every incentive to deceive S1 in order to secure a lower price.
Consequently, S1 will be forced to engage in some amount of searching for patents
covering the products manufactured by its business partners, an activity for which it may
be ill suited. Again, the search responsibilities will not necessarily wind up in the hands
of the most efficient party.
***
The fact that contributory infringers cannot be held liable for patent infringement
absent knowledge of the patent distorts the incentives for search facing both infringers
and patent holders. Suppliers who must make significant product-specific investments
will engage in some amount of search; suppliers who need not will reduce their search
activities effectively to zero. Patent holders and suppliers will thus both engage in mixed
strategies, searching in some cases but not in others. The result will be inefficiently high
levels of search on the part of patent holders (and in some cases suppliers) as they attempt
to compensate for the protection provided by the knowledge requirement and the risk
created by product-specific investments.

39 Whether S1 chooses to engage in search will depend on whether search is efficient—whether S1 will be
able to save itself money by attempting to find existing patents, which would allow it to lower the price on the
components it manufactures for P. See note 37 and accompanying text.
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND DOCTRINAL ALTERNATIVES
A. Discovered and Undiscovered Patents
The previous Part established that patent law’s liability rules allocate search costs in
inefficient and possibly pernicious ways. The question that remains is the extent to which
these misallocations of search costs lead to greater social harms, perhaps because of
reduced incentives to innovate. In order to gain some purchase on this question, it is
useful to consider the circumstances under which a patent holder might come to possess a
patent that covers another party’s commercial product. These circumstances can be
usefully divided into two major categories.
1. Contemporaneous independent invention.
The first involves those situations in which the patent holder and the producer have
independently and contemporaneously invented the same technology—or at least
technology similar enough that the patent reads on the commercial product. Here, search
costs are high on both sides: neither party is aware of the existence of the other. As the
above Part explains, the problems created by this arrangement are twofold. The first issue
is that patent holders will expend excessive resources in less efficient search. This
problem is unavoidable.
The second issue is that patent holders may not succeed in locating producers at all,
leading to reduced returns on their innovation. In some sense, then, the patent holder will
40
remain undercompensated for its research efforts. Yet it is not clear that this presents a
problem from the perspective of social welfare. Here, a commercial firm has
independently developed the patented technology without the incentive of a property
right. As a matter of dynamic efficiency, the existence of the patent was unnecessary to
41
the technological advancement. From the perspective of patents as rewards or
incentives for innovation, then, the case for investing resources in ensuring that the patent
42
holder is fully compensated is weak. This is in addition to the obvious fact that the

40 It is almost a shibboleth among patent-related articles to recite that there is no way of knowing
whether the patent law currently sets incentives to innovate at socially optimal levels. See, for example,
Julie E. Cohen and Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 Cal L Rev 1,
5 n 5 (2001) (“The extent to which the patent system is actually necessary to induce innovation that would
not otherwise occur is an unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, empirical question.”). The point here is
merely that the patent holder will receive less compensation than it would normally be entitled to, given the
contours of its patent and the commercial value of the invention. What to make of this fact as a normative
matter is the subject of the analysis that follows.
41 See Keith N. Hylton and Sungjoon Cho, The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements, 12
Am L & Econ Rev 181, 198 (2010) (“[I]t is believed that there is a dynamic efficiency cost associated with
patent infringement. If patents are infringed easily with no punishment to infringers, innovators will have
weak incentives to invent new products and processes.”).
42 See Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 Ohio St L J 1415, 1419 n 13
(1995) (“The most traditional economic theory relating to patent law is the ‘reward theory,’ which holds
that there will be little or no innovative activity in the absence of patent protection because ideas are easily
appropriated once they are made available to the public.”).
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public will receive the benefit of competition if other firms are able to enter the market,
minimizing the deadweight loss created by monopoly pricing.
At the same time, this means that the patent holder and the producer have likely
wasted resources in simultaneous development of the invention. It might be better, from
the perspective of social welfare, if the producer had simply expended resources in
locating the patent holder and licensing the invention, rather than undertaking the
research and development necessary to create it on its own. If this is the case, then it is
necessary that producers be forced to compensate patent holders, in order that they have
the proper incentives to search rather than innovate.
43
44
This idea is based on the prospect and rent dissipation theories of patents. Those
theories posit that early patent grantees will have proper incentives to develop follow-on
innovations, organizing a technological field to achieve the greatest possible invention
45
with the lowest available duplicative effort. These theories have been called into
significant question, however, with critics arguing that interfirm competition is the best
46
driver of rapid innovation and disputing that patents could ever eliminate rent
47
dissipation. The soundness of these various theories of patent economics is still hotly
contested. Suffice it to say that there are theoretical conditions under which the failure to
compensate a patent holder under conditions of contemporaneous invention could lead to
inefficiency and social loss, but the empirical validity of those conditions remains
questionable.
2. Theft and copying.
The same cannot be said for the second category of situations: those in which the
48
producer actually knows of the existence of the patent. The patent holder may have
actually contacted the producer and offered to license the patent; or the producer may
have found the patent on the market and decided simply to copy the technology rather
than license it. In either event, the case for enforcement of the patent laws is at its apex:
an inventor has created a useful invention that another firm decided to commercialize,

43 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J L & Econ 265, 265–71
(1977).
44 See Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va L Rev 305, 316–
22 (1992) (developing “the idea that the benefit to society of an invention is dissipated when there are redundant development efforts”).
45 See Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 278 (cited in note 43).
46 See Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum L Rev 839, 843–44 (1990).
47 See Donald G. McFetridge and Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A
Comment, 23 J L & Econ 197, 202 (1980) (presenting an economic model suggesting that efficiency gains
realized from the granting of a patent are “dissipated in the rivalry for the patent itself”).
48 Again, the producer must be insolvent and the suppliers must themselves be unaware of the patent
for any real issue to arise. If the producer is solvent, it is directly infringing; if the suppliers know of the
patent, they are liable for contributory infringement as of the moment they take action. In either case, the
situation reduces to the easiest case, in which both parties have strong interests in locating one another.
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and it is important that inventors in this position be able to extract value from their
49
inventions in order to maintain the incentives to continue innovating.
If the patent holder has reached out to the producer, search costs should be negligible
on both sides. The two parties have already located one another. But if the producer has
effectively misappropriated the patent holder’s invention without the patent holder
realizing it, then the patent holder may face substantial search costs in attempting to
locate the producer (much less the supplier). Recall that even though the producer is
50
willfully infringing, it has little incentive to license the patent from the inventor, and
neither P nor S1 has any incentive for P to inform S1 of the existence of the patent
51
(unless S1 must make significant product-specific investments).
Accordingly, there will be some cases in which the knowledge element of
contributory infringement—and its shift of search costs to patent holders—will lead to
52
undercompensation of patent holders who almost certainly deserve remuneration. At
minimum, the threat of nonpaying commercial firms will drive patent holders with
genuinely valuable patent rights toward greater levels of search. And there is little doubt
that these searches will be socially wasteful, compared with the alternative: the producer
knows of the patent holder and could contact it at negligible cost, but instead the patent
holder must expend needless resources searching for the producer.
B. A Negligence Standard
The doctrine of contributory infringement mediates a great number of patent-related
interactions, and thus one should proceed with caution before significantly tampering
with it. Nonetheless, the inefficient and socially wasteful ways in which it allocates
search make contemplation of an alternative worthwhile. Consider, then, an alternative
doctrine of contributory infringement that replaces the knowledge requirement with a
negligence standard: a firm is liable for contributory infringement if it knew or
53
reasonably should have known that it manufactured a component of a patented device.
This minor doctrinal change would have a significant impact on the behavior of
suppliers, producers, and patent holders. Suppliers who might be contributory infringers
would no longer be able to shield themselves from liability by remaining ignorant of
54
potential patent liability. Suppliers who do business with insolvent producers would
49 See Hylton and Cho, 12 Am L & Econ Rev at 198 (cited in note 41); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users
as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U Colo L Rev 467, 471 (2008) (“In the standard analysis, incentives for inventing, disclosing, and disseminating new technologies arise from the potential for
recouping innovative investments through commercial sales.”).
50 See Part II.B.
51 See Part II.C.2.
52 On this normative point, see note 40.
53 Consider MPC § 2.02(2)(d) (“A person acts negligently . . . when he should be aware of a substantial . . . risk.”).
54 It is worth noting that this would not immediately impose liability on every supplier that furnishes
part of an infringing device. In addition to the mens rea requirement, it would be necessary that the part “be
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have to fear bearing the full cost of a suit for infringement, and thus would have
incentives to search for patents covering not just their own products but the products of
the producers with whom they have contracted. In light of these increased incentives for
suppliers to engage in search, patent holders would be able to reduce their own
expenditures on search accordingly. Because search by patent holders is likely less
efficient than search by commercial firms, this would likely reduce the amount of social
waste generated as producers and consumers of intellectual property attempt to locate one
another.
In addition, suppliers would be unable to escape liability for infringing activities that
took place when they were ignorant of the patent. Patent holders would accordingly
recoup a greater percentage of the rents generated by their intellectual property. This is
not unequivocally a positive development; it would likely mean higher prices for
55
consumers and concomitant deadweight losses. But as the previous Part demonstrates,
there are at least a variety of situations in which there will be negative welfare effects if
contributory infringers are able to escape liability.
Moreover, in some cases producers and suppliers in contractual privity could then
allocate the costs of search up and down the supply chain to the most efficient searcher.
This allocation would be possible even if the producer—the likely direct infringer—were
insolvent. For instance, consider the hypothetical supply chain from the previous Part: a
producer (P) that manufactures circuit boards, a supplier (S1) that produces computer
chips, and a second supplier (S2) that develops logic gates for the chips. Suppose that S2
is the only solvent party. If the producer’s circuit boards infringe a patent, S2 may be held
liable regardless of whether it knows of the existence of the patent. But S2 may have little
information about circuit board manufacturers or the state of patent rights. Accordingly, it
might contract for P to engage in a search for applicable patents, adjusting the price of
the components it provides to P accordingly. Of course, this is subject to the caveat noted
in the previous Part: P may not wish to find relevant patents, because they will raise the
price charged by S2, and so S2 may not be able to rely fully on P’s work.
Parties will also be able to allocate the costs of liability up and down the supply
chain. For instance, when P is solvent, S1 could arrange for P to indemnify it against all
liability for infringement, or just against liability arising from P’s products (rather than
S1’s). The party who bears the risk will in many cases be the same party who can most
efficiently search for existing patents. Matters become slightly more complex when one
or more parties are insolvent. If P is insolvent or unreachable by suit, then S1 will
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” 35 USC § 271(c) (defining a contributory infringer).
55 See Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 Harv J
L & Tech 483, 486–87 (2010) (“Strong property rights, in the form of draconian patent enforcement or
broad patent grants, may increase the deadweight loss to society resulting from the grant of exclusive
rights.”).
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effectively be indemnifying P against liability for infringement, a fact that will alter the
contract price at which S1 sells to P. This last fact may complicate negotiations between
P and S1. If S1 is subject to liability for contributory infringement without knowledge of
a patent, then it may need to scrutinize P’s finances to determine whether P can satisfy a
56
damages verdict or whether S1 will be stuck with the entirety of the liability. Thus,
eliminating the stringent mens rea requirement associated with contributory infringement
may in some cases increase contracting costs among parties within a supply chain. At the
same time, however, it will eliminate the ability of firms within that supply chain to
extract rents via contract and force those parties to license patents they might otherwise
have ignored.
Reducing the knowledge requirement for contributory infringement to merely a
negligence standard will of course lead to many more suits for infringement and greatly
heightened vigilance on the part of commercial firms of all stripes. Accordingly, the
preceding analysis should be understood not as a comprehensive case for switching to a
negligence regime, but as a suggestion that such a move may have salutary effects on the
division of search responsibilities. In addition, it is worth noting that § 271’s safe harbor
57
for “staple article[s] or commodit[ies] of commerce” will protect many potential
contributory infringers who would be implicated by a shift from knowledge to
negligence. If it is possible to set liability appropriately via means other than the mens rea
requirement, then adjusting that requirement to allocate search efficiently becomes all the
more attractive.
CONCLUSION
Patent law’s infringement doctrines function not only as rules of liability, but as rules
of search as well. Whether commercial firms must invest resources in searching for
existing patents, or whether patent holders must themselves shoulder the burden of
searching for putative infringers, is determined by the incentives that these parties face to
strike licensing agreements (or enter into litigation) earlier, rather than later. Under
normal circumstances, patent law’s liability rules generate approximately optimal
investments in search. But when a direct infringer is insolvent or unreachable, the fact
that contributory infringers can be held liable only when they have knowledge of the

56 A similar problem arises through the doctrine of joint and several liability. When multiple tortfeasors are each partially responsible for some harm, any single one of those tortfeasors can be held liable for
the full amount of damages. See, for example, American Motorcycle Association v Superior Court, 578 P2d
899, 901 (Cal 1978) (preserving the doctrine of joint and several liability even under a regime of comparative negligence). That single tortfeasor can force the others to indemnify it to the extent that they are responsible, id at 901–02, but this right of partial indemnification is worthless if one or more of the other
tortfeasors is judgment proof. This creates an incentive for potential tortfeasors to examine the finances of
parties with whom they might be involved in a joint action. For instance, a surgeon would likely want to
invest in learning whether the anesthesiologist working alongside her carries sufficient malpractice insurance.
57 35 USC § 271(c).
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patent shifts search responsibilities toward patent holders. The result is inefficient levels
of search and corresponding social welfare losses.
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